|
| | | | |
|
|
Why the gun owner vote didn't
do enough for Casey in Pennsylvania
by Andy
Barniskis
May 23, 2002
"After years of Pennsylvania's gun owners
selling their votes cheaply, a 'pro-gun' candidate thought they could be had for
nothing."
For many gun owners, the 2002 Democratic gubernatorial race in Pennsylvania's
primary election appeared to be a pivotal face-off between the forces of good
and evil. On one hand was former Philadelphia Mayor Ed Rendell, a strident
supporter of gun control in all its forms, and the author of the strategy
intended to bankrupt gun manufacturers by having cities file multiple, frivolous
liability suits against them. On the other hand was state Auditor General Robert
P. Casey Jr., making comforting promises of "no new gun laws" and
"enforcing the laws we already have."
For the casual observer, the choice appeared clear. However, it was barely an
hour after the polls closed that it became obvious that Casey would go down to
defeat, and by 11:00 PM of election night the final percentages had stabilized
at 56 percent of the vote going to Rendell, and 44 percent to Casey. Casey's big
loss came after a massive, last minute effort by the NRA and many of the state's
better-organized gun and sportsmen's groups to support him, with mailings to
their members and with radio and print ads.
As I write this, I am expecting soon to hear Rendell's victory crowed about as a
"massive defeat for the gun lobby," and superficially that would
appear to be true. But is it? I think the answer depends on how you analyze the
situation -- not to mention who is defined as "the gun lobby." It is
an extremely important analysis for those of us concerned about the future
tactics and strategies of the gun rights movement.
To begin with completely conventional, mainstream political analysis, it is
doubtful how many motivated gun rights votes were available, to be mined for a
Democratic primary campaign. The keyword is "motivated." Despite
Pennsylvania's reputation of being equally a gun-owning and union-joining state,
and the fact that there are no doubt many hard core gun rights advocates who are
registered Democrats for a variety of pragmatic personal or professional
reasons, the vast majority of voters likely to pull a voting lever over gun
rights alone have probably been lured to the Republican Party after years of
that party's comforting (if mostly empty) pro-gun posturing, played against the
Democrats' strident anti-gun rhetoric. Few intra-party Democratic campaigns are
likely to find a huge percentage of voters who will provide knee-jerk, pro-gun
votes to the exclusion of all other issues, and the Casey campaign failed to
inspire gun rights voters registered in other parties, or independent voters, to
switch parties just so they could vote for him.
The Rendell campaign concentrated successfully on turning out the Philadelphia
vote, which sometimes, by itself, is sufficient to carry a statewide candidate
to victory. One need only envision the image of traditionally political inner
city church congregations, whipped into a lather by pulpit-politicians invoking
the drug trade and its resulting drive-by shootings, to realize there are few
pro-gun votes to be gotten from that Democratic community. Like many other
states, Pennsylvania suffers from the phenomenon of its biggest city being the
tail that wags the dog of the state.
Despite these considerations, it is within the realm of gun rights politics that
the analysis becomes more interesting. Had only six percent of Democratic voters
changed their votes, the outcome would have been different, so any percentage of
a pro-gun Democratic vote as was to be had was priceless, and there is little
doubt some of that vote was lost. We will never know how much, but we may be
sure it was a factor.
An important question is, what did pro-gun campaigners have available to tell
gun owners, that they didn't already know? Almost everyone attuned to gun rights
issues had already heard of Ed Rendell's multiple, public attacks on gun
ownership and firearms manufacturers, all of which were well documented and
publicized in the mainstream media, as well as by NRA publications and other gun
rights and sportsmen's information outlets. Broadly speaking, the only
information that the rank-and-file could have missed was Bob Casey's somewhat
muted and ambiguous assertions that he would support "no new gun
laws." On election day that proved insufficient, even after it had been
widely trumpeted.
Why the "no new gun laws" message would fail to resonate with
Pennsylvania gun owners may be explainable by recent history. In 1994, the year
of the so-called "Republican Revolution," a coalition of county and
local gun groups across the state had combined to oppose Republican congressman
Tom Ridge's candidacy for governor, because of his anti-gun votes in the U.S.
House of Representatives. The coalition was undermined and overpowered by the
NRA, who supported Ridge strongly, based only upon promises similar to the
now-shopworn "no new gun laws" promise. Ridge was elected governor,
and his thanks to the sportsmen was a Republican sponsored "Special Session
on Crime" in the state General Assembly. Partly at Ridge's insistence, the
mostly anti-civil-liberties package included a comprehensive gun control
package, the first to be put forth in Pennsylvania in many years. But, dubbed
"The Sportsmen's Omnibus Anti-Crime Bill," and endorsed by both the
NRA and HCI, it sailed to passage as the infamous Act 17 of 1995. Attorney
General Mike Fisher - who will be the state's Republican gubernatorial candidate
this November - also wooed the gun rights vote in 1994, then bitterly opposed
even the smallest reforms to the Republican gun control package.
After eight years of Ridge's Republican administration, "no new gun
laws" came to be understood by anyone in Pennsylvania who was paying
attention, to mean "gun control laws will be called anti-crime laws."
Nevertheless, with Clintonista bogeymen to point to, who were promising worse
things yet, Pennsylvania gun rights voters mostly lined up dutifully to deliver
wins to Republican candidates who promised little and then delivered less, or
worse than less. Gun rights voters came to be recognized for the suckers they
were.
While this started primarily as a Republican phenomenon, the concept of
promising nothing and being rewarded for it was readily transferable to
Democratic candidates, and anyone truly motivated by firearms issues today
recognizes "no new gun laws" and "enforcing existing gun
laws" as code for taking the Fifth on which anti-gun laws a candidate is
willing to support. Thus, Democrat Casey's statement of those positions when he
kicked off his campaign early this year did little to encourage truly dedicated
gun rights activists and opinion leaders. His credentials were also regarded as
suspect because of his heritage. As governor, his father, the late Robert P.
Casey Sr., had advocated strict gun control laws, including one that would have
defined a .25 ACP pocket pistol as an "assault weapon." Many wondered
how far from the tree an apple could fall.
Little that Casey did during his campaign helped to assuage suspicions regarding
his sincerity about gun rights. From the very first, he demonstrated a desire to
stand a bit distant from many gun rights groups, except for those he thought he
absolutely had to accommodate, or those that he thought would serve his purposes
while asking no hard or non-negotiable questions. This was demonstrated when our
county group sent him a letter early in his campaign, stating forthrightly that
we had had bad experiences with candidates making vague or ambiguous promises to
us in the past, and that we would like to give him an opportunity to clarify his
positions on several issues. The letter went unanswered. Later, we learned that
Gun Owners of America had sent their candidate's survey to Casey, and that too
went unanswered. Credible sources reported efforts in both Republican and
Democratic camps to boycott Gun Owners of America, and other groups associated
with them, who might be expected to be uncompromising in their pro-gun
positions. Organized or not, it was clear the Casey Campaign supported such a
boycott.
Even many gun rights advocates might argue that in the real world of politics,
it would make sense for a candidate who supported a controversial position to
minimize his public exposure on that issue, and that to do so wouldn't
necessarily indicate insincerity. However, in Casey's case it was interesting to
observe that he made public commitments to positions that would be unpopular
with the voting public, but were supported by organizations that he respected
politically. For example, he committed himself to "30 years and out"
retirement for teachers, even though Pennsylvanians are presently enraged over
soaring school taxes, brought about by legislative mismanagement of the state
public employees retirement fund. One would have to conclude that Casey held no
personal respect for gun rights advocates as a political force, or he would have
promised something publicly and stood by it.
Casey's standoffishness with gun owners continued until approximately ten days
before election day. At that time I received a call from an associate in one of
the state's more active gun rights groups, advising me to expect a call from a
highly-placed Democratic operative in the Casey camp. My associate briefly
described how gun rights groups were being recruited to mount a last-minute
campaign for Casey for Governor, and discussed some logistics for how we could
accomplish it.
The power of the "greater bogeyman" threat is not to be
underestimated. Despite my own reservations about the sincerity of Casey's
friendship, inundation with repeated reminders of Rendell's enmity toward gun
owners inspired me to be initially enthusiastic about the idea of an active
campaign effort - against Rendell, more than for Casey. But, when I quickly made
the few phone calls necessary to seek organizational approval for undertaking
such a campaign, I immediately was brought back to earth with reminders of
Casey's failure to answer our mail. What message would we be sending about gun
owners as voters, if we allowed our questions to be dodged by a candidate, and
then enthusiastically jumped on his bandwagon upon mere invitation to do so?
When the Democratic operative called, I stated that we had to decline
participation in the effort, at which point he practically hung up on me. I had
to force him to take ten seconds to hear why we would not participate, but he
didn't care - if we weren't immediately useful to the campaign, we didn't exist,
and neither did our concerns.
During the next week, the Casey Campaign's desire to stand at a distance from
certain gun rights groups appeared to fade, at least in terms of who they wished
to identify as supporting their campaign. A much-forwarded email message went
around that included references to an endorsement and A-rating of the Democratic
candidate by Gun Owners of America. From the heading on the message it was
traceable to a high-level Democratic operative, and while some expressed the
opinion it was a "mistake," it nonetheless was a mistake that required
clarification in GOA's timely release of their survey results, which included a
specific statement that neither Democratic candidate had responded, and
therefore they weren't supporting anyone.
The campaign efforts put out on Casey's behalf by the participating groups were
sincere and energetic, but from what samples I saw, uninspired. All seemed to
have little to say for Casey, beyond the no-new-laws mantra, and seemed to focus
more on how much we should be against Ed Rendell. A good deal of money was
wasted on such messages in paid ads in the print media, which many recognize as
an inefficient and ineffective campaign medium. Despite their stated support for
Casey, it appears the NRA confined itself to radio ads on his behalf. I waited
to receive their familiar blaze-orange get-out-the-vote postcard, but none was
forthcoming.
I think the Casey pro-gun campaign could best be summarized as failing to excite
anyone except its participants, and that alone could explain its failure. It was
too little, and as a result of the candidate's apparent desire to maintain a
safe distance from gun groups until the last minute, came much too late. Despite
circulated rumors of "promises" of things to come in return for gun
owner support, any such promises were treated as deep, dark secrets to be
concealed from the public, and not to be used to inspire support from the
rank-and-file. The stale "no new laws, enforce existing laws first"
message rang hollow. After years of Pennsylvania's gun owners selling their
votes cheaply, a 'pro-gun' candidate thought they could be had for nothing. Even
many gun rights activists were surprised to learn that isn't always true.
Andy Barniskis is Legislative Chairman for the Bucks County Sportsmen's
Coalition in Southeastern Pennsylvania.
|
|
|
